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COMMENT
FOREIGN SHIPS IN AMERICAN PORTS: THE QUESTION
OF NLRB JURISDICTION
Don F. Dagenais
The National Labor Relations Act appears to include cases involving
international labor disputes within the jurisdiction' of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), but in two recent cases involving the
question of NLRB jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign ships
docked in American ports, the Supreme Court has taken a more restric-
tive interpretation. Such factors as increasing labor costs to American
shippers, the subsequent trend towards registry of United States vessels
under foreign flags, and the anger this has aroused among unionized
maritime workers in the United States have made this issue one of
increasing importance.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the Court's developing
treatment of foreign flag vessel labor law disputes and to suggest a new
scheme for decision in these cases which focuses on the effects of NLRB
treatment and the existence of foreign or international law questions
rather than on the narrow issue of economic consequences within this
country.
I
BACKGROUND
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PANLIBHON FLEET
The practice of registering national ships under foreign flags is centu-
ries old,2 but only within the last five decades has it grown to the point
1. Since cases argued before the National Labor Relations Board will involve applica-
tion of United States labor law, and cases presented in other forums, e.g., state courts or
federal admiralty courts, will be decided under tort or maritime principles, the real issue
behind the surface "jurisdictional" question is that of which substantive law will apply.
The term "jurisdiction," therefore, is used in this Comment in the conflict of laws, rather
than in the procedural, sense.
2. In the sixteenth century many English merchants sailed their ships under the Span-
ish flag, for example, because of the monopolistic Spanish regulations governing trade
with the West Indies. During the seventeenth century Newfoundland fishing boats, whose
owners were in competition with English merchants, often sailed under the flag of France
in order to avoid legal difficulties with England. Similarly, in the 1800's both British and
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where it threatens the survival of the United States merchant marine.
In the 1920's and 1930's the high cost of American labor,3 the expense
of repairing vessels in the United States ports,4 and costly Coast Guard
inspections5 caused United States shipowners to register increasing
numbers of vessels under the flags of foreign countries, usually small
nations seeking to build their merchant marine with foreign capital.
Following World War II, Panama, Liberia, and the Honduras became
the most popular countries of registry.' Liberia, the fastest growing of
the three, has increased its holdings dramatically over the past two
decades' and now, along with Panama, controls substantial percentages
of the world's tonnage in ships.8 By late in the 1950's this so-called
"Panlibhon" fleet had become the object of extreme anger for United
States maritime unions.' The unions called the vessels "runaway
Swiss vessels were known to sail under foreign flags in order to avoid legal problems with
the mother country. These and other examples are cited in B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENI-
ENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 4-11 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BoczEK]. This
work contains the best review of the history and reasons for flags of convenience. Id. at
26-63. See also Goldie, Recognition and Dual Nationality - A Problem of Flags of
Convenience, 1963 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 224-26.
3. BOCZEK 30-32.
4. Id. at 32.
5. Id. at 32; see Hearings on Vessel Transfer, Trade-in, and Reserve Fleet Policies
Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 142 (1957).
6. Although a few ships were registered with Panama and Honduras during the interwar
and World War II eras for a number of different reasons, it was the competitive shipping
market following World War II which gave rise to the spectacular growth rate of the
Panamanian and Liberian fleets. The history of this development is best described in
BOCZEK at 9-25.
7. Between 1949 and 1971, Liberia increased its holdings from a mere 15 ships and
374,000 deadweight tons to a maritime fleet of 2,011 vessels weighing over 71 million
deadweight tons, the largest in the world. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD 4, 8 (1972). Liberia's fleet is still growing.
For example, in 1971 it added 171 ships and in 1972 another 128. Id. at 8; MARIIME
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD's MER-
CHANT FLEETS 1 (1973). Slightly more than half of these represent transfers from other
countries; the rest are new ships, recently built, which are registered from the first under
Liberia's flag.
8. By the end of 1971, Liberia and Panama, the latter controlling nearly a thousand
ships of its own, possessed 18.7 percent of the world's tonnage in merchant ships, including
26.7 percent of the world's tonnage in tankers and 25.1 percent of the tonnage in ore and
bulk carriers. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF MARI-
TIME TRANSPORT 1971, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/Rev. 1 at 8-9 (1973). These tonnage figures
represented about a 25 percent increase in the percentage share of world tonnage increase
since 1965. Because of the dominant position of the Liberian and Panamanian fleets in
the world total, the share of the developed market economy countries of the total tonnage
dipped to only 55.8 percent by the end of 1971. Id. at 7-8.
9. "Panlibhon" is an acronym for Panama, Liberia, and Honduras. For a detailed
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ships,"'" the shipowners preferred to term them "flags of necessity,""
but most writers have lent them a more neutral name: "flags of conveni-
ence.""
B. DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR UNION OPPosrrION
Opposition to flag of convenience vessels has existed in this country,
particularly from maritime labor unions, for over forty years. 3 Labor
leaders point to the fact that, despite, increases in the volume of sea
commerce produced by this country, the use of American flag ships has
dwindled over the past 25 yeais to virtually nothing." Consequently,
berth employment opportunities for United States maritime workers
have also decreased dramatically.
In April of 1958 the United Natiofis Conference on the Law of the Sea
adopted the Convention on the High Seas. At the urging of both Ameri-
can maritime unions and European shipowners, the Convention in-
cluded a requirement in Article 5 that there be a "genuine link" between
a flag of convenience ship and the State whose flag she flies." Later that
discussion of labor union reaction to the practice of sailing under foreign flags, see section
I.B. infra.
10. See Hearings on Vessel Transfer, Trade-in, and Reserve Fleet Policies, supra note
5, pt. 1 at 684 et seq. (statement of Hoyt S. Haddock, Executive Secretary of the AFL-
CIO Maritime Committee).
11. BoczEK 5 & 6 n.11.
12. See, e.g., BoCZEK 4; Goldie, supra note 2, at 220; Comment, The Effect of United
States Labor Legislation on the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard
Labor Relations and Remedies Against Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, The Flag of Convenience Fleet].
13. American labor union opposition began in 1933. BOCZEK 65. For a general history of
labor union opposition, see id. at 64-90. Examples of such opposition in the early 1960's
are found in Shils, "Flags of Necessity," "Flags of Convenience," or "Runaway Ships"?
1962 LAB. L.J. 1009.
14. Between 1951 and 1973 the tonnage of sea commerce in the United States grew from
193.1 million tons to 662.9 million tons, an increase of 243 percent, while the percentage
of that commerce borne in United States flag vessels dropped from 39.8 percent in 1951
to 6.4 percent in 1973. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1974 MARITIME ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL
REPoRT, App. XVII (1975).
15. Employment opportunities decreased from 56,600 twenty-five years ago to approxi-
mately 25,200 in 1973. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1974 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 588 (1974).
16. Convention on the High Seas, March 24, 1961, art. 5, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962). This article says, in pertinent part, that
"ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly," and that:
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular,
the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
This provision was somewhat less strict than one which the opponents of the Panlibhon
fleet had been urging, see Comment, The Flag of Convenience Fleet, supra note 12, at 510
[Vol. 9:50
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year United States maritime unions picketed foreign flag ships though-
out the United States for four days as part of a world-wide campaign
organized by the International Transport Workers' Federation,17 and in
1959 the National Maritime Union and the Seafarers International
Union, longtime rivals on the United States maritime labor scene, com-
bined to form a joint front to combat the problem.'"
This struggle continued throughout the 1960's, although the focus
shifted from the waterfront to the legislatures. Between 1961 and 1972
bills were introduced in practically every Congress to require that cer-
tain kinds of cargo or a minimum percentage of total American cargo
be carried only on ships flying the United States flag." None gathered
enough momentum to pass. In 1965, however, the California state legis-
lature adopted a statute requiring persons issuing, selling, or offering
tickets for passage aboard foreign vessels to "make reference to the
country of registry of such vessel" and to state that such vessels are not
subject to American safety regulations." Similar statutes were subse-
quently enacted in other coastal states, including Florida,2' Maryland,"
and New Jersey."
Waterfront opposition to Panlibhon shipping surfaced again in late
n.86, and left to the determination of individual nations exactly how the requisite control
over shipboard administrative, technical, and social matters was to be exercised. See
Excerpt from the testimony of Arthur H. Dean, head of the United States delegation to
the United Nations Conference, reprinted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 28, Reporter's Note 1 (1965). The practical impact of
the article on the flag of convenience fleet, therefore, has been virtually nil.
17. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1958, at 1, col. 2; id., Dec. 3, 1958, at 73, col. 6; id., Dec. 4,
1958, at 78, col. 1; id., Dec. 5, 1958, at 62, col. 5.
18. BoczEK 79. This joint organization, named the International Maritime Workers
Union, later gave rise to at least one Supreme Court case, Incres S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l
Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963), in which Justice Clark observed that its
primary purpose was that of "organizing foreign seamen on foreign-flag ships." Id. at 25-
26. Incres is discussed at note 56 infra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., H.R. 1204, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 1074, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); H.R. 8315, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 9603, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
H.R. 10799, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. Con. Res. 58, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R.
Con. Res. 640,90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. Con. Res. 641, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968);
H.R. 4513, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
20. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22302 (West 1973). These statements are required to be
"prominently displayed." The requirement of a statement concerning safety regulations
was added in 1973.
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 358.08 (1968).
22. ANN. CODE MD. art. 27, § 195(b-1) (1971).
23. 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-77:12 to 170-77:13 (1971). These New Jersey statutes
were held unconstitutional by New Jersey state courts in 1967 as an infringement upon
the Congress' commerce power as granted by the federal Constitution. Cunard S.S. Co.
v. Lucci, 92 N.J. Super. 148, 222 A.2d 522 (1961), af'd, 94 N.J. Super. 440, 228 A.2d 719
(1967). None of the other state statutes, however, have been attacked on this ground.
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1971 during the coast-to-coast dock strike. The International Longshore-
men's Association 4 and the International Longshore Workers Union"
struck simultaneously to shut down virtually all American ports for the
first time. Partly from a desire to join their fellow unions in putting
economic pressure on shipowners"5 and partly in response to the deterio-
rating employment situation in American ports resulting from increased
use of foreign vessels, leaders of six other maritime unions met in late
October to organize a picketing campaign at several U.S. ports directed
against foreign vessels.Y This campaign attempted to apprise the Amer-
ican public of the "substandard" nature of wages and benefits paid
foreign seamen aboard these ships and the resulting injury to American
maritime laborers. The pickets requested the public to refrain from
patronizing such vessels.2
It was this last burst of picketing activity which led to the two cases
which recently engaged the attention of the Supreme Court.29 Those
24. The ILA controls most maritime labor on the East and Gulf Coasts.
25. The ILWU represents maritime workers on the West Coast.
26. Other maritime unions could not legally picket or strike in support of their fellows
in the ILA and ILWU because of the secondary boycott provisions in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4) (ii) (B)(1970). The other unions were
not involved in the principal strike because the major issue in that dispute, the guaranteed
annual income provision of the ILA and ILWU contracts, was not common to the other
unions.
27. Record at 68-73, Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO,
415 U.S. 104 (1974) (testimony of George P. McCartney, representative of the Seafarers
International Union of North America). Among the six unions represented at the meeting
was the American Radio Association, whose name appears in the subsequent cases con-
cerning this picketing.
Testimony by Mr. McCartney indicated that the meeting was called to "attempt to take
some measures to correct a desperate situation." Focusing on the deteriorating job situa-
tion of United States maritime workers, McCartney said:
It was pointed out ... that this could be traced to the competition of foreign
flag vessels, the substandard wages and conditions of these vessels, in direct
competition with the American Merchant Marine; and it was felt ... that the
best possible course of action for us to follow was publicity picketing to call this
to the attention of the American public, to request their support and cooperation,
to ask them to patronize American ships and, in conjunction with this, to assist
the American seaman.
Id. at 71.
28. The signs carried by the pickets advised the public that wages paid to foreign
crewmen were "substandard" and claimed that "this results in extreme damage to our
wage standards and loss of our jobs." The pickets requested that the public not patronize
the picketed vessel. Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n AFL-CIO, 415
U.S. 104, 107 (1974); see also American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n,
419 U.S. 215, 217-18 n.2 (1974).
29. Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 U.S. 104
(1974) and American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215
(1974).
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cases, which changed the focus of prior law on the subject of NLRB
jurisdiction over picketing of Panlibhon vessels, must be seen against
the backdrop of earlier labor law on the subject.
II
THE QUESTION OF NLRB JURISDICTION 30
A. EARLY CASES
Section 2(6) of the National Labor Relations Act" defines "com-
merce," over which the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdic-
tion,3" as trade, traffic, commerce, transportation or communication
"between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia" or "through any other State or any Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia or any foreign country." The legislative history of this
definition indicates that it was intended to give the NLRB all the power
constitutionally delegable under the commerce clause.,,
Although the question of the Board's jurisdiction over flag of conveni-
ence fleet vessels did not arise until 1950,11 the Board asserted jurisdic-
tion as early as 1936 to determine the appropriate bargaining units for
seamen on vessels traveling between the United States and foreign
30. Previous discussions of these legal questions include BoczEK; H. MEYERS, THE NA-
TIONALrrY OF SHIPS 56-68 (1967); Currie, Flags of Convenience, American Labor, and the
Conflict of Laws, 1963 SUPREME COURT REV. 34; Goldie, Recognition and Dual Nationality
- A Problem of Flags of Convenience, 1963 BRnT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220; Note, Panlibhon
Registration of American-Owned Merchant Ships: Government Policy and the Problem
of the Courts, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 711 (1960); Comment, Flags of Convenience and NLRB
Jurisdiction, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 195 (1965); Note, 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 111 (1975);
Note, Labor Law, International Law and Panlibhon Fleet, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1342 (1961);
Note, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1974); Comment, The Flag of Convenience Fleet,
supra note 12.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1970).
32. Under § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), the
Board "is empowered. . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor prac-
tice . . . affecting commerce."
The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the power to "regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 2. The power of Congress to use this clause to delegate power to the National Labor
Relations Board over labor matters was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1936).
33. The basic jurisdictional definitions were "based squarely on the power of Congress
to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations. . . ... H.R. REP.
No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 6 Legis. Hist. NLRA 2918 (1935). The same comment
was repeated at H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., lst Sess. 8-9, 6 Legis. Hist. NLRA 2964
(1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 6 Legis. Hist. NLRA 3057 (1935).
34. Compania Maritima Sansoc Limitada, cited in 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1610.1723
(1972).
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ports. The issue first arose in Panama Railroad Co.," where the em-
ployer as part of its transportation business maintained four large
steamships which traveled between New York, Haiti, and the Canal
Zone. The NLRB found no difficulty in establishing jurisdiction; the
company, it said, was "directly engaged in traffic and commerce be-
tween the United States and foreign countries" and the seamen in ques-
tion were "directly engaged in such traffic and commerce."3 The union
involved was promptly certified. 7
The next year the Board followed its decision in Panama Railroad and
took jurisdiction over ships involved in foreign commerce in
International Freighting Corp." and Curtis Bay Towing Co.," two other
representation cases. In 1940 the Board took another step, extending its
jurisdiction in American-West African Lines, Inc.4" to cover an unfair
labor practice case in which the employer involved was in the business
of international freight shipping. All these decisions were followed in
subsequent cases.
Not until 1957 did the Supreme Court rule on the subject, but when
it did, its decisions dealt the Board a sharp reversal.
35. 2 N.L.R.B. 290 (1936).
36. Id. at 292.
37. Unions are certified as bargaining agents by the NLRB following Board determina-
tion that the union represents a majority of the employees. See § 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1970).
38. 3 N.L.R.B. 692, 695 (1937).
39. 4 N.L.R.B. 360, 363 (1937).
40. 21 N.L.R.B. 691 (1940). Decisions of the NLRB relating to jurisdiction over busi-
nesses in foreign commerce were not, of course, limited to cases involving shipowners. In
The Royal Bank of Canada, 67 N.L.R.B. 403 (1946), the Board for the first time decided
a case in which the employer involved was actually a foreign corporation. The case in-
volved a bank with its principal office in Montreal, Canada, which operated a branch in
San Juan, Puerto Rico. The branch bank, the Board found, had "a close, intimate and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce within the Territory of Puerto Rico
. ." Id. at 417. Royal Bank was followed in a subsequent decision concerning a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Swedish corporation which was authorized to do business in Louis-
iana. Delta Match Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400, 1401 n.2 (1953).
Another case decided in the early 1950's, although it did not involve the NLRB, is also
indicative of the Board's expanding jurisdictional concepts. In Norris Grain Co. v.
Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1950), an American union in conjunction with a
Canadian union picketed a Canadian ship docked at a port in the United States in an
attempt to prevent a grain company incorporated in Illinois and doing business in Minne-
sota from dealing with the Canadian shipping firm. A state court in Minnesota issued an
injunction at the grain company's request, but the Supreme Court of Minnesota disagreed
since it felt that the NLRB had federal jurisdiction which would preempt the state court's
jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 107, 46 N.W.2d at 103. For a brief discussion of the labor
law doctrine of federal preemption, see note 57 infra.
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B. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: BENZ, MCCULLOCH, AND ARIADNE
The first case decided by the Supreme Court on the issue of NLRB
jurisdiction over ships in foreign commerce, Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S.A.,4 involved a flag of convenience fleet vessel. A Panama-
nian ship flying a Liberian flag was docked in Portland, Oregon, when
its crew members began a strike over internal matters. The crewmen
named a United States union on shore as their collective bargaining
representative, and the designated union and others promptly began
picketing the vessel. The case arose on an attempt by the shipowner to
enjoin the picketing. The Court squarely held that the NLRB lacked
jurisdiction to consider the dispute. Since the controversy concerned "a
foreign employer operating under an agreement made abroad under the
laws of another nation,"42 the Court said, a jurisdictional grant would
have to be found in the intentions of Congress.
The parties point to nothing in the Act itself or its legislative history
that indicates in any way that the Congress intended to bring such
disputes within the coverage of the Act.
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such
an important policy decision when the possibilities of international dis-
cord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.4 3
Faced with this setback, the Board at first distinguished the case in
its maritime labor decisions" and later fell to creating an entirely new
rule which, though not in direct conflict with Benz, ignored its thrust.
The key case, West India Fruit & Steamship Co.," involved a Virginia
corporation charged with an unfair labor practice arising out of an inci-
dent which took place in Cuban waters aboard a ship of Liberian registry
carrying a crew of Cuban nationals. Taking its lead from an earlier
Supreme Court case on the jurisdiction of United States courts over
cases under the Jones Act," the Board formulated a "balancing of con-
41. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
42. Id. at 142.
43. Id. at 142, 147.
44. See, e.g., Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1101 n.7 (1958).
45. 130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961).
46. Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970),
covers seamen injured in the course of their employment. In Lauritzen the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Jackson, sought to establish guidelines for the application of the Jones
Act to foreign shipping operations. Among these were the nationality of the owners, situs
of the injury, country of recruitment or signing of the seamen, nationality or residence of
the seamen, and the home port of the vessel. For a discussion of the Lauritzen case see
1975]
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tacts" test to govern the question of jurisdiction. It did have jurisdiction
over the case at hand, the Board held, since a strike of the ship's crew
would have immediate effects on United States commerce." The Board
formulated the controlling question as "whether or not the facts in the
present situation which constitute contacts between the operation of the
[ship in question] and the United States are substantial - that is,
more than minimal but not necessarily preponderant."" Benz, it said,
involved greater foreign contacts than the situation it now faced, and
thus was consistent with the broad principle just established."
For several years West India dominated the Board's treatment of the
foreign flag jurisdictional issue, but in 1963, in two cases arising on
similar facts, the Court declared that not only did the NLRB lack juris-
diction over labor disputes involving the internal affairs of foreign flag
vessels, but that state courts could entertain efforts by shipowners to
outlaw the picketing.
In the first of the 1963 cases, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras,"0 the National Maritime Union petitioned the
NLRB for certification as the bargaining agent for unlicensed alien crew
members employed on Honduran-flag vessels. The vessels were operated
by a wholly-owned subsidiary of an American corporation, but their
labor relations were governed by several provisions of the Honduran
Labor Code.5 When the Board decided to exercise jurisdiction and or-
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 472 (2d ed. 1975). The NLRB treated the
case and its progeny in 130 N.L.R.B. at 354-55.
47. Said the Board:
Clearly a strike of the Sea Level's crew would have immediate effects within the
territory of the United States, whether or not that strike occurred in Cuba or Belle
Chasse [Louisiana]. It is the foreign commerce of the United States that is
involved in this proceeding, and that surely is a domestic interest of the United
States ....
130 N.L.R.B. at 352-53.
48. Id. at 355.
49. Id. at 361-63. In Benz, however, the Court had spoken of "the possiblities of interna-
tional discord" in such situations, see quotation cited accompanying note 43 supra, and
the Board in West India had before it a plea from the Department of State that the NLRB
abstain from jurisdiction since Board treatment might violate treaty commitments. Fol-
lowing West India, moreover, protests from Panama, Liberia, and the Honduras were
raised. BOCZEK 186. Despite these protests, the Board retained jurisdiction. Portions of the
Department of State documents are reprinted in 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 27-33 (1963).
50. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). McCulloch was actually a consolidated treatment of three cases
arising upon similar facts.
51. According to the opinion by Justice Clark, these Honduran laws established mini-
mum qualifications for any union which might represent crew members aboard Honduran-
flag vessels and also recognized the qualified Honduran union as the sole bargaining agent.
See 372 U.S. at 14.
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dered an election to be held among the seamen," both the shipowners
and the Honduran union which claimed to represent the crew filed suit
in lower federal court to enjoin the election. The Court unanimously53
upheld their claims, and found the Board without jurisdiction. Observ-
ing that the "balancing of contacts" approach might lead the Board to
"inquire into the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels,"
which would be contrary to the international law doctrine that the law
of the flag governs a ship's internal affairs,54 the Court focused on the
necessity of avoiding "embarrassment in foreign affairs."
* . . The possibility of international discord cannot therefore be gain-
said. Especially is this true on account of the concurrent application of
the Act and the Honduran Labor Code that would result with our ap-
proval of jurisdiction.5
McCulloch thus reasserted the principle of Benz that the labor relations
of a foreign vessel and her crew cannot be governed according to United
States labor law.
Incres Steamship Co., Ltd. v. International Maritime Workers
Union,56 the companion case to McCulloch, took the ouster of NLRB
jurisdiction one step further and held, in accordance with the labor law
doctrine of federal preemption,57 that a state court has jurisdiction to
52. In cases where two separate unions contest the right to act as the bargaining agent
for a designated group of workers, the NLRB is empowered under § 9(c) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970), to direct an election by secret ballot to resolve the controversy.
The mechanism of section nine of the Act is discussed more fully in notes 92-93 infra and
accompanying text.
53. The vote was 8 to 0. Justice Goldberg did not participate.
54. 372 U.S. at 19-21. For further discussion of the "internal affairs" doctrine see note
69 infra and accompanying text.
55. 372 U.S. at 21.
56. 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
57. The labor law doctrine of federal preemption, created and articulated in a series of
Supreme Court cases of which San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959) is the prime example, holds that, within the area staked out by the NLRB's
monetary jurisdictional guidelines, the Board possesses exclusive jurisdiction over dis-
putes involving activities which are "arguably" either protected or prohibited by the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. A principal corollary to this doctrine is that
in cases in which the NLRB does not have jurisdiction, state courts may proceed to decide
labor law disputes.
This doctrine is, of course, subject to some exceptions. Suits for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, for example, can be brought in state courts by aggrieved persons
against either the employer or the union under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), whether or not the activities complained of consti-
tute unfair labor practices. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Persons
suffering personal or property damage can maintain state court actions against unions for
damages if union activity violates § 8(b)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), under
LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970). Union members can sue their union in a state court
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entertain such disputes when the NLRB is barred from doing so. This
presents the puzzling anomaly that state courts can plunge into a field
fraught with foreign relations while the federal National Labor Relations
Board, for that very reason, cannot. In reaching such a result in Incres,
the Court appears to have extended established doctrine beyond its
original rationale.58
In 1969 the Court decided another flag of convenience fleet case, but
this one arose on slightly different facts and the Justices, with a close
eye on the essential elements of Benz and McCulloch, distinguished
their prior cases and arrived at a different result. International Long-
shoremen's Association, Local 1416, AFL-CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,
for damages on the theory of a breach of the duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967). And state 6ourts may proceed under the state police power to consider
questions involving labor law where an "overriding state interest" is of concern. UAW v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1958).
These exceptions, however, are just that - exceptions - and the general principle
stated above is normally applied, as in Incres. For discussions of the doctrine of federal
preemption see 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1 5505-5505.99 (1972); THE.DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
785-807 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
58. The rationales of the federal preemption doctrine have been (1) to create uniformity
in the field of labor law, and (2) to entrust to the agency Congress created for that purpose
the job of developing nationwide rules of labor law. It would seem, therefore, that the
principle that where the NLRB has no jurisdiction state courts can decide labor law issues
should apply only where the cases involve matters within the cognizance of both the state
courts and the Board. In most situations both the state courts and the Board are compe-
tent to deal with the issues, but Incres should have been recognized as an example of a
new class of cases: there the Board lacked jurisdiction because the case, which trod into
matters of foreign relations, was beyond the competence of the agency. This being so, the
Court should have dismissed Incres from the jurisdiction of the state courts as well as the
NLRB since they, presumably, are no more capable of dealing with the issue than the
federal agency. Instead, the Court followed the traditional rules of federal preemption and
assumed without discussion that, since the case was found beyond the realm of the Act,
the state courts were competent to decide the issue. 372 U.S. at 27.
The ultimate embarrassment of Incres would be for a state court to refuse to enjoin the
union picketing, thus allowing an American union to gain a hold on the internal affairs of
a foreign flag ship, a result which would defeat the purpose of the Court's decisions in Benz
and McCulloch. Fortunately, no major case since Incres has had this result; all have
resulted in injunctions against the picketing. See, e.g., Ryan v. Hirsch, 174 Ohio St. 461,
190 N.E.2d 262 (1963); State ex rel. Seafarer's Int'l Union of North America, Great Lakes
District v. Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, 174 Ohio St. 466,190 N.E.2d 263 (1963);
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416, AFL-CIO v. Eastern S.S. Lines, Inc., 211 So.2d
858 (Fla. 1968); American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 291 Ala. 201,
279 So.2d 467 (1973), afl'd, 419 U.S. 215 (1974). Several pre.Incres cases had reached the
same result, including Fruit Dispatch Co. v. Nat'l Maritime Union of America, 138 So.2d
853 (La.Ct.App. 1962) and Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of
Canada, 18 Wisc.2d 646, 119 N.W.2d 426 (1963). Contra, Marlindo Campania Naviera S/A
v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of North America, 47 CCH LAB. CAS. $ 18,252 (1963). This
criticism was also recently made in Note, 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 111, 124 (1975).
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Ltd.," involved peaceful picketing in Florida ports by United States
unions to protest "substandard wages paid by foreign-flag vessels to
American longshoremen working in American ports" 0 rather than at-
tempts by United States unions to represent alien crewmembers, as had
the prior cases. The owners of the picketed ships, a Liberian corporation
and a Panamanian corporation, attempted to enjoin the picketing in the
state courts, but the Supreme Court held the NLRB to have jurisdiction
and thus preempt the state courts from hearing the cases.6" Benz and
McCulloch, it observed, involved instances in which NLRB handling of
the labor relations in question "would necessitate inquiry into the 'inter-
nal discipline and order' of a foreign vessel, '6 2 while the controversy in
the case at hand was distinguishable:
The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not
obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid
American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve
as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work. There is
no evidence that these occasional workers were involved in any internal
affairs of either ship which would be governed by foreign law. 3
Because of this essential factual difference in the cases, the Court saw
no need to bar the NLRB from jurisdiction. The Board would be dealing
with American labor relations here, not the controversies of foreign ship-
owners and their foreign workingmen.
The chain of Supreme Court cases beginning with Benz and conclud-
ing with Ariadne, therefore, constructed a scheme of rules which at-
tempted to guarantee that United States labor law, which should not
govern internal labor relations of foreign flag vessels," would apply only
59. 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
60. Id. at 196. None of those doing longshore work for the ship, however, belonged to
the union. Id. This, coupled with the fact that the pickets also distributed handbills to
the effect that the ship was unsafe, id. at 196 n.1 (see note 21 supra for a citation to the
Florida law authorizing such publicity), indicates that the real purpose of the picketing
was to protest the overall injury to the American merchant marine rather than the wage
conditions at one particular spot.
61. For a discussion of the doctrine of federal preemption in labor law, see note 57 supra.
62. 397 U.S. at 198.
63. Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
64. This statement must be qualified to some extent with recognition of another and
quite different line of cases which were decided in the 1960's and which arose on facts
similar to those of the cases discussed in this Comment. In these other decisions the focus
was whether or not state courts could enjoin the picketing of foreign flag vessels despite
the bar of § 1 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), which
forbids United States courts from issuing injunctions in a "labor dispute" except in certain
circumstances. In 1960 the Supreme Court held that Norris-La Guardia, unlike the
NLRA, did indeed apply to flag of convenience fleet situations, and that injunctions were
barred. Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Shipping Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960). For a
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where the union was protesting economic injury to workers of this coun-
try, and not where it was attempting to influence shipboard labor rela-
tions. As a tool for making this distinction, the cases examined the
possibility of conflict with foreign law.6"
C. JURISDICTION IN MARITIME LAW
While the principles of asserting or declining jurisdiction over vessels
with foreign contacts are unfamiliar in the realm of labor law, they are
more common to maritime law. The doctrines enunciated in the Benz
through Ariadne line of cases comport very comfortably with traditional
notions of maritime jurisdiction.
Under general principles of maritime jurisdiction," an American court
has the power to judge events of a maritime nature regardless of where
recent case along this same line, see Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texas
v. Int'l Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots, AFL-CIO, 456 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
65. Compare Benz, 353 U.S. 138, 142 (NLRB has no jurisdiction because the contro-
versy was between "a foreign employer and a foreign crew operating under an agreement
made abroad under the laws of another nation") and McCulloch, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (NLRB
has no jurisdiction because of the "international discord" which could result from "the
concurrent application of the Act and the Honduran Labor Code") with Ariadne, 397 U.S.
195, 200 (NLRB has jurisdiction since there was no interference which was "likely to lead
to conflict with foreign or international law"). This tool of analysis is discussed in depth
in section I.C.3 infra.
As early as 1964 lower federal courts had grasped and were applying this legal frame-
work. In NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964), for example,
the Fourth Circuit reviewed an NLRB complaint by a Bermuda shipping corporation to
enjoin an American union from refusing to unload any ships which traded with Cuba. The
union policy had been adopted at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. The court held
the Board to be without jurisdiction because the case involved a political question rather
than a labor dispute, but on the foreign flag issue the court decided in favor of the NLRB.
Benz and the others, it said, "all relate to shipboard labor relations, something very
different from the present case." Id. at 995. This same distinction was utilized in
Mountain Navigation Co., Inc. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of North America, 348 F. Supp.
1298 (W.D.Wisc. 1971), which involved picketing by American unions of Liberian flag
vessels in protest of the economic damage suffered by United States workingmen. Con-
cluding that the NLRB had jurisdiction in that case, the court noted that:
Ariadne confined the McCulloch and Incres holdings to the proposition that the
NLRA does not apply to foreign vessels with foreign crews only in those situations
where an American union attempts either to organize and represent the foreign
crew or to aid the crew in a dispute involving the internal discipline and order of
a foreign vessel. In other respects, the NLRA does apply to matters relating to
foreign ships with foreign crews.
Id. at 1302 (emphasis in original).
66. For a discussion of maritime jurisdiction, see G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY
LAw IN THE UNITED STATES 14-54 (1939) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON]. An excellent
summary of maritime jurisdictional principles can also be found in 7A J. MoORE, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE .190-.244 (2d ed. 1972).
[Vol. 9:50
Foreign Ships and NLRB Jurisdiction
the events may have occurred,67 and may retain such jurisdiction so long
as the court in its discretion feels that justice will be served. 8 There is
no immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts for privately
owned vessels in American waters. To this rule, however, there is one
exception: in matters involving the "internal affairs" (or "internal econ-
omy") of a foreign vessel, United States courts normally will not take
jurisdiction. 9
According to the "balancing of interests" approach to the application
of admiralty law, 0 United States courts will even take jurisdiction over
maritime lawsuits between foreigners, although a certain amount of
discretion is exercised in these cases." And a court may decline jurisdic-
tion by use of forum non conveniens.72 The question of whether the
matter is governed by foreign law is one of the primary considerations
in the exercise of this discretion." In accordance with admiralty jurisdic-
67. RoBINSON 15. Robinson cites pertinent cases at 15-20. In personam or quasi in rem
jurisdiction must exist before judgment can be rendered, of course, but as far as the
subject matter is concerned American admiralty courts have jurisdiction over all contracts
of a maritime nature and all torts occurring on navigable waters. MOORE, supra note 66,
at .20012].
68. For a discussion of the use of the discretionary principle in admiralty cases, see
notes 71-74 infra.
69. ROBINSON 20. This doctrine is closely associated with a provision in many treaties
between the United States and other nations that the local consul has jurisdiction over
these "internal economy" cases rather than domestic courts. Id. at 20. Whether the princi-
ple has a force independent of those treaty provisions is unclear, although the source cited
indicates that the doctrine stands on its own.
In certain cases involving criminal actions aboard foreign ships docked in American
ports, domestic courts have cast aside the "internal economy" limitation and taken juris-
diction over the prosecution since the incident has disturbed the "public peace." Wilden-
hus' Case, 120 U.S. 1, 18 (1888).
70. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 12 (1972). See also Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953),
discussed at note 46 supra and accompanying text.
71. This important principle received Supreme Court blessing in The Maggie
Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 457 (1869):
. . . it seems to be settled that our admiralty courts have full jurisdiction over
suits between foreigners, if the subject-matter of the controversy is of a maritime
nature, but the question is one of discretion in every case, and the court will not
take cognizance of the case if justice would be as well done by remitting the
parties to their home forum.
Sixteen years later ip another case the Court said that
. . . the courts will use a discretion about assuming jurisdiction of controversies
between foreigners in cases arising beyond the territorial jusidiction of the country
to which the courts belong. ...
The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365 (1885).
72. G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 51-52 (2d ed. 1975).
73. In The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885), the Court noted that one of the major
factors in the balance was whether the question was "governed by the laws of the country
to which the parties belong. . . ... Id. at 363.
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tion, American courts have retained lawsuits involving foreign flag ves-
sels, including flag of convenience fleet ships, where no substantial in-
justice would result." Where the legal questions are based entirely on
foreign law, however, jurisdiction may be declined.75
Consonant with this broad maritime jurisdiction, Congress has since
the late decades of the nineteenth century supported laws designed to
hinder foreign competition to American shipping operations. Some of
these provisions impose absolute bans on certain operations by foreign
ships, such as transporting passengers between United States ports, 6
dredging in United States waterways," or carrying cargo from one place
to another in this country. Others merely impose regulations, thus
74. See, e.g., Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949) (District Court has
discretion to retain jurisdiction over dispute between Argentine crew members and Argen-
tine shipowner for salvage and wages); Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel, G.m.b.H.
v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 801 (1954)
(District Court abused discretion by declining jurisdiction over suit between German
cargo owner and Norwegian corporation where the alternative forum would be inconven-
ient for a witness); Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463
(5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) (District Court abused discretion in
declining jurisdiction over controversy between foreign nationals arising out of collision
on high seas where there was no showing that taking of jurisdiction would have worked
an injustice); Burie v. Overseas Navigation Corp., 205 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd
per curiam, 323 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1963) (District Court may retain jurisdiction over case
involving discharged seamen and a foreign flag vessel when libellants' remedy in another
forum is uncertain); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. S.S. Silver Isle, 257 F. Supp. 562 (D.
Ohio 1966) (District Court was within discretion in retaining jurisdiction over suit by U.S.
nationals against a Canadian vessel for damage to cargo in absence of showing by respon-
dents that they would be deprived of substantial justice in a United States court); Petition
of Chadade Steamship Co., 266 F. Supp. 517 (D. Fla. 1967) (District Court had jurisdic-
tion over case where Panamanian shipping company asserted limitation of liability follow-
ing incident in which the ship burned and sank); Poseidon Schiffart, G.m.b.H. v. M/S
Netuno, 361 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.Ga. 1973) (District Court refused to decline jurisdiction
in action between foreign parties over collision between foreign vessels where no special
circumstances affirmatively established that retention of jurisdiction would work an injus-
tice).
75. See, e.g., Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515 (1930)
(District Court may decline jurisdiction in case between British corporations for recovery
of general average deposit where English law would govern).
76. 46 U.S.C. § 289 (1970), first passed in 1866, prohibits foreign vessels from transport-
ing passengers between U.S. ports "under a penalty of $200 for each passenger so trans-
ported or landed." This provision was designed to prevent foreign companies from compet-
ing with American operators for the passenger trade in this country. See The Granada,
35 F. Supp. 892 (E.D.Pa. 1940).
Two other sections, however, 46 U.S.C. §§ 289a and 289b (1970), establish a limited
exception for Canadian vessels in cases where no American flag passenger service exists.
77. 46 U.S.C. § 292 (1970), first passed in 1906.
78. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970). This section bars such carriage "in any other vessel than a
vessel built in and documented under the laws of the United States . . ." Similar provi-
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increasing the cost to foreign shipowners,"9 or assess discriminating
duties on goods transported in foreign flag bottoms." Regardless of the
nature of their effect, however, these laws represent a willingness on the
part of American lawmakers to extend the reach of our legal system to
cover foreign shipping operations in the interest of protecting the liveli-
hood of United States laborers.8'
Under traditional maritime law, acts of Congress, and the Benz
through Ariadne interpretations of United States labor law, therefore,
it was until recently recognized that this country would not hesitate to
resolutely apply its own law to foreign shipping operations where the
essence of the matter was the welfare of American workingmen, and not
the private business of foreign companies.
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: WINDWARD SHIPPING AND MOBILE STEAMSHIP
Not until 1974 did the scheme of labor law jurisdiction outlined in the
Benz through Ariadne decisions show any signs of instability. In that
year the Supreme Court in two major cases dramatically changed the
rule of law in this area and developed a major new test, the ramifications
of which are still uncertain.
Both of the 1974 cases arose out of the 1971 multi-union picketing
campaign of Gulf and West Coast ports in protest of the competition for
work opportunities presented by flag of convenience fleet vessels.82 This
effort engendered attempts by foreign shipowners in both Houston,
Texas and Mobile, Alabama to enjoin the picketing. The Houston case
reached the Supreme Court first.
In Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Association,
AFL-CIO, the Supreme Court held that the Texas state courts, and not
the National Labor Relations Board, had jurisdiction to consider the
dispute. In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court recognized that
the picketing activities before it "do not involve the inescapable intru-
sion into the affairs of foreign ships that was present in Benz and
sions were passed as early as 1898. The purpose is to protect the American merchant
marine from foreign competition. See Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
79. 46 U.S.C. §§ 313-15 (1970).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 128 (1970). Unless overridden by a treaty, this section imposes a ten
percent ad valorem duty on goods imported in vessels "not of the United States." The
intent is to secure for American vessels the sea cargo business. See 21 Op. Avr'Y GEN. 597
(1897).
81. On the purposes of the federal statutes, see the cases and opinions cited in notes
76-78 and 80 supra.
82. For a decription of this picketing campaign, see notes 24-28 supra and accompany-
ing text.
83. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
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Incres," but said that the prior cases had not exhausted the definition
of "the threshold of interference with the maritime operations of foreign
vessels" which would define the parameters of NLRB jurisdiction.
The Court then articulated a new basis for decision in foreign flag ship
cases. Since the picketing by American unions was an attempt to "exert
sufficient' pressure so that foreign vessels would be forced to raise their
operating costs to levels comparable to those of American shippers," the
Court said, the accomplishment of the unions' aim would undoubtedly
have "more than a negligible impact" on the foreign ships' operations
here and throughout the world. Regardless of whether the reaction of
foreign shipowners would be to boycott American ports or to raise the
wages of their crewmen, and therefore their overall costs, the economic
effects extended beyond United States borders. Concluded the Court:
Virtually none of the predictable responses of a foreign shipowner to
picketing of this type, therefore, would be limited to the sort of wage-
cost decision benefitting American workingmen which the LMRA
[Labor Management Relations Act] was designed to regulate. This
case, therefore, falls under Benz rather than Ariadne.Y
Windward Shipping thus stands for the proposition that it is not only
the possible conflict with the internal affairs of foreign vessels but also
the scope of the economic impact of the picketing involved which deter-
mines NLRB, and thus state court, jurisdiction.
Having lost their argument in Windward Shipping that picketing of
foreign flag vessels was protected under the National Labor Relations
Act and was as a result within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the six
unions involved took the opposite approach and argued in the Mobile,
Alabama case that the picketing was prohibited by the Act and, there-
fore, that the Board should be held to have jurisdiction for that reason.5
84. Id. at 114 (footnote omitted). The Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), otherwise known as the Taft-Hartley Act, amended the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), by adding the section 8(b) provisions for union unfair labor
practices. Windward Shipping, which involved a protest against union activity, would
have been decided under those amendments had it been within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented in Windward
Shipping on the ground that "the Court effectively deprives American seamen, among all
American employees in commerce, of an' federally protected weapon with which to try
to save their jobs." 415 U.S. at 116. Reviewing the Benz through Ariadne line of decisions,
Brennan concluded that Ariadne was the controlling precedent:
Respondents' target is to persuade shippers not to patronize foreign vessels, and
respondents have no concern with the form of the shipowners' response that
makes their efforts succeed.
Id. at 121.
85. Under the language of the Garmon decision on federal preemption, see note 57
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In American Radio Association, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Associa-
tion, Inc.," the Court, in another opinion by Justice Rehnquist, rejected
these arguments as well. Although the Mobile Steamship litigation was
instituted primarily by stevedoring companies seeking to service the
foreign ships,8" rather than by the foreign shipping companies them-
selves, as was the case in Windward Shipping, the Court thought this
difference was of no consequence.
While we ... spoke in Windward of the effect of Houston pickets on
the maritime operations of foreign ships, . . . we fully recognized that
this effect would not be produced solely by the pickets and the messages
carried by their signs. It would be produced in large part by the refusal
of American workingmen employed by domestic stevedoring companies
to cross the picket line in order to load and unload cargo coming to or
from the foreign ships.88
Thus, the Court held, employers of workers who obeyed the picket line
and refused to service foreign flag ships were not "in" commerce within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act any more than were
the foreign flag shippers themselves. The employers' "response," the
Court said, was "a crucial part of the mechanism by which the maritime
operations of the foreign ships were to be affected."8" Under the rationale
of Windward Shipping as amplified by Mobile Steamship, therefore, no
union or employer whose members or employees might respond in ways
which could affect the economic interest of foreign flag ships falls under
the NLRA definition of "commerce," and thus within National Labor
Relations Board jurisdiction.
Windward Shipping and Mobile Steamship, taken together, represent
supra, acts either protected or prohibited by the NLRA or its amendments are exclusively
within the realm of the NLRB.
86. 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
87. The Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., is the collective bargaining agent for sev-
eral stevedoring companies in the Mobile area. It originally brought suit in an Alabama
state court seeking to enjoin the picketing of the foreign flag vessels since its workers had
refused to cross the picket lines and had disrupted the companies' business at the port. A
Mobile County farmer seeking to ship his soybeans was also allowed to intervene as a
plaintiff. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 291 Ala. 201, 204,
279 So.2d 467, 469 (1973).
88. 419 U.S. at 224.
89. Id. The Court in Mobile Steamship also disposed of two constitutional questions
raised by the unions and decided that the state's injunction against the picketing violated
neither the first nor the fourteenth amendements since the state was enforcing a valid
public policy and the picketing was for a prohibited purpose.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented, primar-
ily on the ground that the case involved a secondary dispute between the stevedoring
companies and the union and should be within the province of the NLRB under the
Ariadne decision. Id. at 237.
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a dramatic departure from the principles established in the Benz
through Ariadne line of cases. The focus on the possible economic effects
of union activity and employers affected by such activity encompasses
situations that, under the old test, would never have been of concern. A
primary strike in this country of unionized manufacturers of factory
equipment, for example, might well produce adverse secondary eco-
nomic consequences for foreign flag shippers who would otherwise be
transporting the articles abroad. They could be forced to limit their
operations, lower wages, or even stop calling at certain ports altogether,
and under the recent cases, the Court could bar the NLRB from consid-
ering the dispute. A primary strike of longshoremen would have an even
more direct impact; it could well force foreign flag operators to curtail
their operations for a considerable length of time. Again, the NLRB
could be ousted from jurisdiction. By extending the rationale a step
further, the Court could conclude that the mere certification of an
American union among domestic maritime workers could lead to union
activity which would adversely affect such shipping operations and ex-
tend beyond "the sort of wage-cost decision the LMRA was designed to
regulate."9 Thus, even that innocuous activity could be beyond the
Board's realm.
It is reasonable, of course, to assume that the Court when presented
with future cases on this problem will develop distinctions which cut the
extension of Windward Shipping and Mobile Steamship somewhat short
of the results contemplated here. Until it does, however, lower courts are
left to struggle with a test and supporting language so broad that, until
the limits are better defined, virtually all maritime labor activities may
be left to the state courts rather than to the NLRB.9'
The awkwardness of the Court's new approach, moreover, reveals a
more fundamental flaw in the Court's historic treatment of this prob-
lem. In a world where national economies are international in scope
rather than confined within national boundaries, and where the labor
relations of one enterprise may have substantial impact upon those of
another, foreign enterprise, perhaps limited and inward-looking con-
90. Windward Shipping (London), Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 U.S. 104,
115 (1974).
91. This situation creates a special exception for maritime labor disputes which does
not apply to other types of labor conflicts which may affect international operations. Labor
relations in the airline industry are governed by the National Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88, and the National Mediation Board (NMB) established thereun-
der. Several cases have held that the NMB has jurisdiction to consider labor disputes
concerning airlines which have at least some flights in the United States. Air Line Dis-
patchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C.Cir. 1951); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses
v. Northwest Airlines, 267 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1959). There is no substantial difference
between the jurisdictional principles governing the NLRB and the NMB.
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cepts of jurisdiction are no longer so practical. Until a truly
multinational system of law is developed, of course, no one national
legal scheme can decide international cases, but individual legal sys-
tems can, with imagination, undertake to consider a number of compet-
ing factors and decide to apply their law in cases of international scope
whenever the rights of other legal systems are not infringed. The Court,
in deciding the foreign flag shipping cases, should try to develop such a
principle rather than key its analysis on more limited considerations. It
is to this problem, therefore-the question not of what the jurisdictional
rules have been, but of what they should be-that we must now turn.
I
IN SEARCH OF A BETTER RULE
A. EFFECT OF NLRB JURISDICTION
The first and most obvious consideration which an American court
must balance when faced with a flag of convenience fleet case is the
effect which application of United States labor law would have upon the
foreign parties to the dispute.
If an American labor union attempts to organize the alien crew of a
foreign flag ship in the hopes of becoming its bargaining representative,
the resulting conflict between employer and union is handled through
the mechanism of section nine of the National Labor Relations Act."
Under this series of provisions, unions wishing representation and em-
ployers desiring to resolve claims among competing unions may petition
the Board for assistance and the matter will be resolved by means of an
NLRB-supervised election among the employees. 3 If a union is certified
as the bargaining representative, both union and employer have a duty
to "meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith"'" with one an-
other over mandatory subjects95 of bargaining. Actions by an employer
tending to frustrate the operation of this mechanism, coerce employees
in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively, and to refuse to
bargain with a certified union are among those activities which can be
92. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). An essential prerequisite to such an election, according
to this section, is that the Board have "reasonable cause to believe that a question of
representation affecting commerce exists .... " The elections are conducted by secret
ballot.
94. This obligation is contained in § 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
95. Defined in the above section as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment . . . ." Id. An entire body of law has developed on the question of what
subjects are "mandatory" items under this language. See 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. 3020 at
7609-11 (1972).
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labeled unfair labor practices by the Board"6 and made the occasions for
NLRB santions to be enforced in federal court.9 7
Because of the close and direct involvement of the Board in this
important stage of the collective bargaining relationship, the impact of
United States labor law on a foreign flag shipper in this situation would
be quite immediate. His actions during the course of an election cam-
paign, if found discriminatory, could lead to a Board injunction or inval-
idation of an employer victory at the ballot box. A refusal to deal with
the certified union might result in a bargaining order from the Board.
And, of course, any contest of these sanctions would involve him in
litigation in American federal courts. No more immediate a business
interest exists for an employer than his economic relationship with his
workers, and interference with this aspect of a foreign flag vessel's opera-
tions would invade the very essence of the internal economy of the
vessel." Traditional principles of comity9 and maritime jurisdiction' °0
bar the application of United States labor law in this situation, where
its impact upon the foreign flag shipper is so far-reaching.
In other circumstances, however, the extent of NLRB supervision over
the bargaining relationship is not so extensive, and the question of the
Board's jurisdiction becomes much more difficult. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a United States union pickets a flag of convenience fleet vessel
in support of efforts by the ship's own crew to organize themselves for
collective bargaining purposes. Such activity would likely be a violation
of labor law principles'0 ' and could therefore be enjoined by the Board.' 2
In order to obtain this result, however, the shipper, if the Board had
jurisdiction, would have to file a complaint and present his arguments
in that forum. Under current law, by contrast, the employer, under
Incres,'0 3 must resort to a state court instead of the NLRB and present
his case under theories of traditional tort law"4 rather than labor law.
96. Section 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970), establishes five categories of
unfair labor practices for employers. Unions, of course, can be guilty of unfair labor
practices as well. These are enumerated in section 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
97. Under § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970), the Board may petition a United States
Court of Appeals for enforcement of its orders.
98. Comment, The Flag of Convenience Fleet 514.
99. See notes 111-14 infra and accompanying text.
100. See section II.C. supra.
101. Section 8(b)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), the so-called "secondary
boycott" provision, makes illegal union coercion for the purpose of forcing an employer to
bargain with an uncertified union.
102. The Board has authority to issue injunctions under §§ 10(a) and (c), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) and (c) (1970).
103. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
104. Foreign flag shippers have generally obtained injunctions from state courts on the
theories that the picketing interferes with the business affairs of the vessel and disturbs
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Although the substantive legal argument would change under NLRB
jurisdiction, the involvement of the foreign flag shipper in United States
tribunals and the probable result of the effort would be identical under
either alternative. Rather than being on a different footing than Ameri-
can employers' 5 the shippers in question would enjoy no more extensive
protections than those available to their domestic counterparts. More-
over, it would be they who would be seeking the assistance of American
labor law, rather than having such provisions forced upon them. In this
type of situation, therefore, the effect of the United States labor scheme
would not be so pervasive as in the first example, and the jurisdictional
question might well hinge on factors other than the mere effect of NLRB
treatment.
Finally, consider a situation such as that presented in Windward
Shipping and Mobile Steamship,'8 where an American union pickets
foreign flag vessels not to interfere with their labor relations, but to
protest declining employment opportunities for United States workers
because of foreign flag competition. Again it is the shipper who would
seek legal protection, not the union. In the hands of the state court, an
injunction barring the picketing would surely issue. ' Before the NLRB,
the case would involve complicated arguments of substantive labor law,
thus perhaps presenting the union with a somewhat more favorable
forum. Nonetheless, the likelihood is that an injunction would issue
from the Board as well.' 8 As was the case in the previous example,
existing contractual relationships. For a thorough discussion of these points, see the state
court opinion in American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 291 Ala.
201, 279 So.2d 467 (1973). See also the cases cited in note 58 supra.
105. Comment, The Flag of Convenience Fleet 520.
106. Discussed in part II.D. supra. See also notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
107. In virtually all state court cases since Incres, where the state tribunal is clearly
held to have jurisdiction rather than the NLRB, the court has issued an injunction against
the picketing on the authority of the tort law doctrines mentioned in note 104 supra. The
cases are collected in note 58 supra.
108. Such picketing on the surface would appear to be illegal under §§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(C)
and 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(C) and 158(b)(7)(C) (1970), which
prohibit unions from forcing an employer to bargain with a non-certified union or recog-
nize a union which has not petitioned with the Board. In Int'l Hod Carriers Union, Local
No. 41 (Calumet Contractors Ass'n), 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961) and Houston Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962), however,
the Board held that in cases where the union picketed to protest wages paid by employers
which were substandard to those paid by other employers in the area whose employees
were represented by the picketing unions, such picketing was not organizational picketing
within the meaning of those sections. This, rather, was "area standards" picketing pro-
tected by the Act. Whether the union picketing in a case such as that in our hypothetical
would qualify as "area standards" picketing is questionable. Even if that hurdle were
passed, however, the picketing would still have to surmount the tests of Sailor's Union of
the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950), designed to ensure that the
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therefore, the actual effect of the NLRB handling of the case is that it
moves the foreign flag shipper's lawyers from one legal forum to another
- an impact not so devastating as to make the jurisdictional issue turn
on this consideration alone.
In summary, only in the first of the three situations above - where
an American union is attempting to organize and represent a foreign
crew - is the involvement of the NLRB in the shipper's internal affairs
so complete as to require a rejection of Board jurisdiction on this consid-
eration alone. In the other examples it is the employer, and not the
union, which will seek from the Board a declaration of unfair labor
practices. The worst that could happen under NLRB jurisdiction, from
the foreign flag shipper's point of view, would be for the Board to refuse
to enjoin the picketing. This would result in economic pressure placed
on foreign enterprises on behalf of American workers-an activity prac-
ticed for many years by the government itself09 and by no means a
violation of international law."'
B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Where the results of possible NLRB jurisdiction are not conclusive on
the question of whether or not such jurisdiction should be allowed, other
factors must come into play as well. Principal among these are consider-
ations of international comity, the extent to which the dispute involves
questions of foreign relations, and the desire of uniformity in labor law.
International comity consists not of binding rules but of practices
undertaken by states out of what one international law author has called
"politeness, convenience and goodwill.""' Under rules of international
comity, one nation will generally extend recognition within its own terri-
tory to the legislative, executive and judicial acts of another.' Ameri-
picketing specify the primary dispute and avoid implications of secondary pressure, before
it could be held legal under the Act. For a general discussion of the labor law applicable
to secondary picketing, see 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1436 (1972).
109. See, e.g., the federal statutes enacted to protect American maritime workers from
foreign competition discussed in notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text. Virtually every
American tariff, of course, can be cited as an example of this kind of pressure. A more
notorious such act was the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the United States, Britain, and
other countries.
110. Oppenheim, for example, observes that "no special right or rights of intercourse
between the States exist according to the Law of Nations," and concludes that where
states interfere with international trade they "do not act in contravention of International
Law." 1 L. OPPENIIEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 321, 323 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
111. Id. at 34.
112. Comity is, as one United States court has recently said, "a nation's expression of
understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience
and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws." Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 433 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
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can courts have long followed the doctrine,13 but have also recognized
that it may be withheld where its acceptance would be contrary to the
interests of this country."' In foreign flag shipping cases, there is always
a possibility that the foreign vessels' economic interests may be pro-
tected under the governmental policy of foreign states."5 Where such
protection exists, the jurisdictional question may depend on a balance
between comity considerations and the interest of domestic workers
involved. While the policy of respect for the actions of foreign govern-
ments is important, it should not take precedence over a national inter-
est in the protection of maritime workers, if indeed the court finds such
an interest.
A second factor, closely related to the first, is the extent to which the
dispute involves questions of foreign relations. Where the politics of
diplomacy are of concern, courts in this country have traditionally been
very reluctant to interfere with the processes of coordinate branches of
government,I" and the foreign flag shipping situation should present no
exception. As the Court has recognized, however, some aspects of inter-
national law "touch more sharply on national nerves than do others,"
and where an issue is relatively less important for our foreign relations,
the justification for deference to the political branches is correspond-
ingly weaker."I7 The place at which the instant cases come to rest on this
sliding scale is open to question, but should it be near the point of
One of the better statements of comity principles is the following by Judge Andrews of
the New York Court of Appeals:
Comity may be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the
family of nations owes to the others. It presupposes friendship. It assumes the
prevalence of equity and justice. Experience points to the expediency of recogniz-
ing the legislative, executive and judicial acts of other powers. We do justice that
justice may be done in return.
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259,
260 (1923). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40, Reporter's Note 2 (1965).
113. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
114. See, e.g., Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3d Cir. 1971). An example of such a policy is the refusal of American courts, despite
principles of comity, to enforce the penal and revenue laws of other states. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 110, at 328 & n.4. For a detailed discussion of this matter, see Note, A New
Approach to the Act of State Doctrine: Turning Exceptions Into the Rule, 8 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 273, 281-86 (1975).
115. For example, Liberia contended in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court
in the Windward Shipping case that an approval of NLRB jurisdiction would conflict with
provisions of its own statutes. Similar arguments on behalf of foreign nations have been
advanced before the NLRB by the State Department. See note 49 supra.
116. This reluctance was demonstrated in the very first flag of convenience fleet dispute
decided by the Supreme Court, the Benz case. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
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exclusivity a court may find this factor controlling in the question of
NLRB jurisdiction.
A final consideration may weigh into the balance in support of the
other side. It is undisputed that in the interests of predictability and
equality of treatment, labor law questions should be treated by means
of a uniform national system of law;"' any limitation of National Labor
Relations Board jurisdiction should be carefully scrutinized with this
value in mind. The instant cases, presenting as they do possible excep-
tions to such a concern, could turn in a close situation on the interests
of labor law uniformity."m
These factors are only facets of a much more basic principle which,
because of the countervailing considerations on both sides, should gov-
ern the question of how far national jurisdiction should extend over
activities which have international ramifications. It has long been recog-
nized that each nation has the right to govern the activities of its own
citizens, and even to extend the reach of its laws into other territories
where acts harmful to it are being perpetrated.' The converse of that
118. The need for national labor law uniformity, in fact, was one of the major reasons
for the creation of the National Labor Relations Board. A prominent illustration of the
uniformity principle in operation is the doctrine of federal preemption, discussed in note
57 supra.
119. An additional factor, less obvious than the others but nonetheless important, is
the ability of labor unions to react on a multinational level to the concerted activity of
corporations and groups of corporations across national boundaries. It has become clear
that multinational corporations have the capacity and willingness to shift production
among their various national plants to maximize their bargaining effectiveness. Seham,
Transnational Labor Relations: The First Steps Are Being Taken, 6 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L
BUSINESS 337, 343 (1974); see also Comment, National Labor Unions v. Multinational
Corporations: The Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
124, 125 (1972); M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
287-90 (1970). National labor unions, however, have not been able to deal on a multina-
tional level with such corporations, and a major reason for this inability has been that
"national laws on the subject have never before been applied in a transnational setting
.... " Seham, Transnational Labor Relations, supra, at 358-59. The need for workable
conflict of laws rules in the international labor sphere, thus, has never been more para-
mount. By applying United States labor laws in the foreign flag cases, American courts
could begin to clarify the question of which law governs.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965) (a state may prescribe a rule of law to attach sanctions to conduct occurring outside
its territory if the conduct has substantial adverse consequences within the state); 1 C.
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 241 et seq. (2d rev. ed. 1945). This principle has often been
invoked by United States courts. For example, in Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir.
1944), the court held that the Federal Trade Commission has the power to issue cease and
desist orders when it discovers unfair trade practices being committed by American busi-
nessmen doing business in Latin America. Said the court:
The right of the United States to control the conduct of its citizens in foreign
countries in respect to matters which a sovereign ordinarily governs within its own
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precept should also be true: where it is a legal protection which is
sought, rather than a legal sanction, the jurisdiction of the protecting
country should extend far enough to afford that protection, so long as
similar rights of other states are not infringed.2 ' Any jurisdictional cov-
erage short of that point fails to uphold national interests in areas where
there is no real danger from doing so.
C. THE TESTS FOR JURISDICTION
Application of the above principle to flag of convenience fleet cases is
extremely difficult. The gray area between permissible and impermissi-
ble jurisdiction is so broad that the rule is unworkable without specific
tests to assist in the line-drawing.' 2 Of the factual and legal tests which
can be utilized for this pupose, three seem to be the most useful: identi-
fying the parties to the dispute, discovering the intentions of the union
in undertaking its actions, and examining possible conflicts with foreign
or international law.
territorial jurisdiction has been recognized repeatedly .... Congress has the
power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the
United States, although some of the acts are done by citizens outside the terri-
torial limits of the United States.
Id. at 35. This was neither an invasion of the sovereignty of other countries nor an "at-
tempt to act beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
For similar holdings, see SEC v. Briggs, 234 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (upholding
jurisdiction over a United States citizen served in Canada for violation of registration and
anti-fraud provisions of American securities laws) and Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton
Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that the court had jurisdiction in a
trademark case involving international commerce). But see the RESTATEMENT, supra, at §
38, Reporter's Note 1.
121. Cf. Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 9, April 30, 1948, [1948]
2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, entered into force Dec. 13, 1951, where it is said that
each State has the right to defend itself, to "provide for its preservation and prosperity,"
to legislate its laws and "administer its services," and to "determine the jurisdiction and
competence of its courts," but that "[tihe exercise of these rights is limited . . . by the
exercise of the rights of other States in accordance with international law." A similar
principle was stated in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941):
[ . . T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.
See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1952); Scotch Whiskey Ass'n
v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1973).
122. While the following tests are meant to provide assistance in the determination of
jurisdiction, we should carefully note that they are mere tools and nothing more. The real
principle is still that which is articulated in the text, and any attempt to substitute simple
tests for broad principle will lead to mistaken analysis and disserve the interests of a
workable jurisdictional rule.
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1. Parties to the Dispute
Where the parties to a flag of convenience labor dispute are all Ameri-
can, as in Mobile Steamship,' the interests at stake are paramount for
the domestic litigants but are likely to be minimal to the foreigners
involved. It is the United States litigants who have either sought the
forum or chose to defend themselves in it, and it is they, and not the
foreign shippers, who will be directly affected by its decision.
Concomitantly, litigation involving a foreign flag shipping company
as a direct party in interest is far more likely to have immediate effects
upon that party's internal affairs. Subject as it would be to the variety
of orders which can be issued by the National Labor Relations Board
- and punishment by contempt for refusing to obey an order which is
enforced 2 ' - the internal affairs of the shipping company would to a
large extent be in the hands of American law. This, of course, would
conflict with the right of the company's own country to prescribe legal
rules governing such matters, and thus would be a violation of the juris-
dictional principle proposed above.
2. Intentions of the Union
A union design to represent and become the collective bargaining
agent for alien crewmembers is far more likely to lead to litigation in-
volving American forums in the private affairs of foreign shipowners
than is a union picketing campaign which is meant only to publicize
declining job opportunities for domestic workers.", If the union has
undertaken its picketing with an intent to involve itself with the working
relationship between the shipping company and its crew so much that
the company will at some time be forced to bargain with the union, then
any sanction the NLRB might give that activity would permit a disrup-
tion of the ship's internal affairs by American labor law. On the other
hand, if such an intention is not present, the Board should be able to
take the dispute and judge it on its merits without fear that internal
disruption will result.
123. See notes 86-89 supra.
124. Where the orders of the NLRB are enforced by one of the United States Courts of
Appeals, see note 97 supra, disobeyance of them is punishable by means of contempt, as
is the case with any other order of the court.
125. In Mountain Navigation Co., Inc. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union of North America, 348
F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Wisc. 1971), the court formulated the distinction between Benz and
Ariadne in terms of whether or not an American union "attempts. . . to organize and
represent the foreign crew" or aid the crew in an internal dispute. See the quotation in
note 65 supra.
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3. Conflicts with Foreign or International Law
As early as 1957, in the Benz case, the Supreme Court thought that
"possibilities of international discord" presented a major obstacle to
NLRB jurisdiction in foreign flag shipping cases. By 1963, in
McCulloch, concurrent application of foreign and American law was
thought to prohibit jurisdiction. The 1969 Ariadne decision held the
other way, at least in part, because no likely conflict was found with
foreign or international law.'26
Where the possiblity of conflict with foreign law exists, the likelihood
of an infringement upon a foreign nations' right to protect its own citi-
zens increases. The mere possibility, however, should not block such
jurisdiction.'2 Rather, a court should engage in a complete search of the
relevant foreign and international law to determine whether such dis-
cord in fact exists. If so, jurisdiction is likely barred. If not, there is no
reasonable barrier, at least on this ground, to an extended application
of United States labor law.
In order to fully evaluate all possible conflicts, a court utilizing this
tool of analysis should examine three separate bodies of law: (1) the
labor law of the foreign nation in question, (2) the basic "public policy"
of that nation's law, especially its labor law,'2 and (3) rules of interna-
tional law which may possibly be controverted.
Examination of the relevant foreign law should not be difficult. Al-
though foreign law was for many years treated in United States courts
as a question of fact to be proven by the parties,12 recent state statutes3 '
126. See note 65 supra. The foreign law analysis was used more recently by Justice
Brennan in his Windward Shipping dissent. Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. Am.
Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 U.S. 104, 121 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. In the Supreme Court cases summarized in note 65 supra, the Court never explored
the question beyond the mere determination of a theoretical conflict. In its restatement
of the rule, the American Law Institute took this approach for granted and asserted that
"applying the Act to conduct in U.S. ports would have controlled conduct abroad."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38, Re-
porter's Note 1 (1965); see also id. § 28, Reporter's Note 2.
128. The Hungarian author Szaszy took a careful look in 1968 at the problem of apply-
ing labor law in forums other than that of its origin, and determined that:
It has been accepted as a universally valid principle, even where statutes are
silent about it, that the otherwise applicable labour law cannot be applied when
to do so would conflict with public policy . . . . (emphasis in original)
I. SZASZY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 179 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SZASZY].
129. See, e.g., Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 872 (1956). The common law doctrine that foreign law should be treated as a question
of fact had its origin with Lord Mansfield in the eighteenth century and continued until
its recent modification by the Federal Rules and some state statutes. The history of the
doctrine is discussed in Sass, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 16
Am. J. Comp. L. 332, 335-39 (1968).
130. For examples of such statutes, see N.Y. Crw. PRAc. R. 4511 (McKinney 1972); 2
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and Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3' have made the
determination of foreign law a question for the judge and not the jury.
Counsel would ordinarily be expected to present the foreign law to the
court although, at least in federal courts, the court itself can undertake
independent research if it wishes. 3 ' Judicial notice of foreign law, there-
fore, can easily 1' be taken under our system.'34 If, having taken such
judicial notice, the American court finds no provisions of foreign labor
law which would be contravened by NLRB treatment of the dispute,
there should be no bar on this ground to granting the NLRB jurisdiction.
Evaluation of the second branch of this three-pronged analysis, the
labor law public policy of the country involved, may be somewhat more
difficult. The leading commentator on this question has observed that
the principle of public policy ... precludes the application of foreign
rules of law whose application or actual effects in a given case, would
conflict with the moral, ideological, social, economic and cultural ideas
of the [foreign nation], its concepts of equity and justice, the fundamen-
tal institutions of the legal order . . . and the principles of its social and
economic life.In
VA. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 8-273 (1957); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 310-11, 450-60 (West 1966). See
also UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT, art. IV, approved by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962. For a a discussion of some of the state
statutes and the Federal Rule, note 131 infra, see Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in
Transnational Litigation: The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign
Law, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16-23 (1973).
131. Federal Rule 44.1 provides that in cases where the law of a foreign country is in
issue, "[t]he court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or
source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party, or admissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence." The court's determination is treated as a ruling on a
question of law. This Rule was added in 1966. See also FED. R. EvD. 902.
132. While the Note of the Advisory Committee formulating the Rule pointed out that
"in determining [foreign] law the court is not limited by material presented by the
parties," decisions since the adoption of the Rule have indicated that courts will not
usually undertake such research on their own without the help of counsel. See, e.g.,
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826
(1968).
133. The principal problem of determining foreign law in this country is that of finding
available research materials. The international and foreign law collections of most Ameri-
can law libraries, however, are growing, and the presumption behind the trend outlined
in notes 130-32 supra and accompanying text is that research in foreign law is no longer
an insurmountable problem. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 48-49 (3d ed. 1970)
and sources cited therein.
134. This is especially true in cases involving flag of convenience fleet vessels. Many of
the cases involve Liberian ships, and Liberian research materials are, fortunately, readily
available in English. The codes, court decisions, attorney general opinions, and legal
articles of Liberia have been compiled according to familiar form since the Liberian
Codification Project began its work under the direction of Professor Milton Konvitz at
Cornell University in the 1950's.
135. SZASZY 180. The author was actually speaking of situations in which the court of a
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Ascertainment of such broad principles may be obtained from the testi-
mony of witnesses familiar with the foreign state's law, 3 ' international
conventions to which the state is a party, rules of international law in
which the nation acquiesces,' and presumptions that foreign public
policy is similar to our own. 38 Foreign courts which have analyzed the
public policy of extraterritorial forums appear to have done so without
undue difficulty. 31 If a foreign public policy is found to hold values alien
to those of American labor law, the court should not grant the NLRB
jurisdiction.
The third area of exploration under this tool of analysis is that of
international law rules. Judicial cognizance of international law is easier
than that of foreign law,40 and American courts are familiar with the
basic doctrines.
The most likely principle to be invoked is that of foreign state sover-
eignty. Ever since the days when individual states derived their power
from the monarch's ability to control large areas of land,' a "terri-
rorial" sovereignty giving the government power over acts within its
territory has been basic to the law of individual nations.' The concept
forum state would be called upon to apply rules from a foreign nation, but the analysis
appears equally applicable to the situation at hand.
136. Even where foreign law is a question for the court to determine, testimony of expert
witnesses is common. One court, in fact, has held that presentation of the text of a foreign
statute, without demonstration of its subsequent interpretation, is not enough. Applica-
tion of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191 F. Supp. 206, on reargument, 192 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1961).
137. Where a domestic scheme of labor law is "at variance with cogent rules of interna-
tional law," the principle of inconsistency with public policy will "assert itself." SzAszY
180.
138. It is a familiar doctrine of American courts that basic principles of law are common
to all civilized countries and that, in the absence of a contrary showing, the principles of
one country will be presumed consistent with those of another. See, e.g., Parrot v. Mexican
Cent. Ry. Co., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911).
139. Pertinent cases are cited in SZASZY at 182-83.
140. It was established early in this country's legal history that:
International law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69,
72-73 (1940); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 169 (1894).
International law, in contrast to the old "fact" doctrine of foreign law, see note 129 supra
and accompanying text, is easily subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., Ocean Ins. Co. v.
Francis, 2 Wend. 64, 69 (N.Y. 1828); Peters v. McKay, 195 Or. 412, 425, 238 P.2d 225,
230 (1951), petition for rehearing denied, 246 P.2d 585 (1952).
141. J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 142 (4th ed. 1949).
142. OPPENHEMI, supra note 110, at 116-18. As recently as 1949 the International Court
of Justice recognized that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty
is an essential foundation of international relations." Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J.
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of national sovereignty has been subject to increasing encroachment in
recent years, however."' As multinational rules of law become more
widely recognized, individual national governments may no longer have
the last say over the law which governs their citizens;' one interna-
tional court already has the authority to overturn decisions of national
tribunals.'45 In cases in which investigation into foreign and interna-
tional law is used as as tool of analysis, American courts will have to
review this trend and gauge the importance of state sovereignty in the
case at hand.
Another pertinent international law rule is the familiar one that a
vessel is governed by the law of the nation whose flag she flies.'4 ' This
doctrine was codified by the United Nations Convention on the High
Seas,'47 and by a ruling of the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the case of the S.S. Lotus.' The rule is not absolute, however. Sev-
eral provisions of United States shipping laws, for example, make it
illegal for any common carrier entering American ports to pay or allow
rebates, to resort to discriminatory or unfair trade practices such as
refusing available space accommodations, and the like.' 9 Again, in indi-
vidual cases the court will have to judge whether this principle, such as
it is, would be violated by applying United States labor law. If so, then
such labor law would, by definition, be "governing" the foreign vessel,
a strong indication that NLRB jurisdiction would be improperly
granted.
Along with these rules, of course, the court will have to consider other
international legal arguments advanced by the parties.
4, 35. The Court in that very case, however, limited the sovereign powers of Albania by
holding it liable to Great Britain for damage caused by Albanian mines to a British ship
in the Corfu Channel, when Albania had given no forewarning.
143. See, e.g., 1 SCHWARZENIERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (3d ed. 1957). The trend is
discussed in 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-82 (1963). Expanding
concepts of national jurisdicition, see notes 120-21 supra, are further evidence of this
movement.
144. The following is stated in Oppenheim, supra note 110, at 119:
The very notion of International Law as a body of rules of conduct binding upon
States irrespective of their Municipal Law and legislation implies the idea of their
subjection to International Law and makes it impossible to accept their claim to
absolute sovereignty in the international sphere.
145. This is the European Court of Human Rights, established by Article IV of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 24 (Supp. 1951).
146. This rule was mentioned by the Court in McCulloch, see note 50 supra, but was
not explored in detail. 372 U.S. at 21.
147. U.N. Convention on the High Seas, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 13/L.53, art. 6(1) (1958).
148. Case of the S.S. "Lotus", [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 25.
149. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 816 (1970).
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A careful evaluation of the three questions outlined above should
prove extemely valuable to courts considering whether American labor
law should govern flag of convenience fleet cases. While answers to the
individual consideration will not usually dispose of the overall problem,
each will yield a better understanding of the underlying ramifications
of granting jurisdiction to the Board. Knowledge of each of the possible
effects should enable a court to make a more fully reasoned decision
than those which have hitherto been made in foreign flag shipping cases,
and such decisions, cognizant as they will be of the international juris-
dictional principles involved, will more readily sustain the heavy burden
placed on national courts in an international world.
CONCLUSION
As more and more American shippers have in recent years resorted
to registering their vessels under the flags of foreign nations, the ques-
tion of whether or not the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes involving these vessels has become a point of
strong contention between the NLRB and the Supreme Court. A series
of cases in the last twenty years seemed at last to have settled the
dispute, but with the recent Windward Shipping and Mobile Steamship
decisions, the Court has created new rules of questionable logic with
unknown ramifications. The Court's decisions, however, have served one
useful purpose: they have illustrated the dangers of oversimplifying the
problem and grasping for easy tests rather than facing the broad juris-
dictional questions which are inevitably involved.
This Comment has addressed the problems of which international
jurisdictional principles should govern these cases and of how to imple-
ment them. Whether the approach taken here is used, or whether an-
other is developed, however, is relatively unimportant. The essential
point is that the flag of convenience fleet cases, like an increasing num-
ber of cases in the international sphere, are beginning to pose the key
issue of how to reconcile the competing values of protecting American
legal interests and staying within the strictures of international comity.
Until now the point at which the balance is struck has not been carefully
chosen. Until it is, one set of interests will continue to suffer the needless
expense of overprotecting the other.
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